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What Is a Life Worth in North Carolina?
A Look at Wrongful-Death Awards
RALPH PEEPLES*
CATHERINE T. HARRIS**
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the amounts recovered in 123 wrongful-death cases
filed in North Carolina over a five-year period. The dataset is unique in
that it includes both jury verdicts and settlements. Although the injury—
death—was the same in each of these cases, the amounts recovered varied
greatly. Several patterns emerge from the data. First, there is a strong
negative correlation between age and the amount recovered. Second, the
manner in which the decedent died seems to make a difference. Violent
deaths, for example, led to larger recoveries than did nonviolent deaths.
Third, jury verdicts produced much larger recoveries than did settlements.
Finally, the results underscore the critical role of insurance in wrongfuldeath cases.
INTRODUCTION
What is a life worth, expressed in dollars? To most people, this
question might seem odd, for several reasons. One might ask why one life
is worth more than another, or why and how the value of a life is to be
expressed in dollars. Placing a dollar value on a human life might seem
distasteful to some, if not repugnant. Even if this objection can be
overcome, the second question remains: How can the value of a life be
measured? What method is appropriate? For lawyers, however, these are
routine and unsurprising questions. When lawyers deal with these
questions, they add an indirect phrase to come up with answers: following
the guidance of wrongful-death statutes, they ask, “What is a life worth,
expressed in dollars, to the deceased’s survivors?” The effect on the
survivors is the focus of most wrongful-death statutes and litigation.
* Ralph Peeples is a Professor of Law at Wake Forest University.
** Catherine T. Harris is a Professor of Sociology at Wake Forest University. We
thank Matthew Barnes for his excellent research assistance. We are grateful to attorney
Robert M. Elliot for his many helpful comments and suggestions.
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The focus of this Article is empirical. The Article reports on the
results from 123 wrongful-death claims asserted in North Carolina over a
five-year period. The dataset is unique, in that it combines information
from both settlements and trials. The dataset also includes results from
wrongful-death claims regardless of the tort involved. Disparate torts, such
as motor-vehicle accidents, medical malpractice, intentional torts, and
products liability, all contribute cases to the dataset. This approach allows
us to consider whether the way in which death occurs affects the amount
recovered in wrongful-death actions.
I.

BACKGROUND

A number of highly publicized attempts have been made in recent
years to value a wrongfully taken human life. The most obvious example
is the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.1 Shortly after the
September 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress established a compensation
fund for those injured in the attacks and for the families of those killed.2 In
the enabling act, Congress required consideration of the victims’ economic
loss, thus making disparate awards inevitable.3
More recently, General Motors proposed a schedule for compensating
the families of individuals who died as a result of ignition-switch defects in
vehicles manufactured by GM.4 Under the program, GM has proposed to
pay a minimum of one million dollars for the death of each decedent, plus
$300,000 for the surviving spouse and $300,000 for each surviving
dependent of the decedent.5 These amounts establish a floor for the award;

1. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.1 to .81 (2014).
2. Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401–409,
115 Stat. 230, 237–41 (2001), amended by James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 124 Stat. 3623. The 2011 amendments reactivated the
fund to compensate first responders and individuals who later experienced health problems
related to 9/11.
3. Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act § 405(b)(1)(B), 115 Stat. at 238; see
also 28 C.F.R. § 104.43. The highest amount awarded from the fund was $7.1 million and
the lowest was $250,000, with a mean award of over $2 million and a median award of
almost $1.7 million. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? 156–57, app. at 202
(2005); see also William Glaberson, Lawyer Math in Sept. 11 Deaths Shows Varying Values
for a Life, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/11/national/
11DAMA.html?pagewanted=all (illustrating the perspectives of several personal-injury
lawyers on the legal consequences of the 9/11 attacks).
4. See GM IGNITION COMPENSATION CLAIMS RESOL. FACILITY, www.gmignition
compensation.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2015).
5. GM IGNITION COMPENSATION CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITY, FINAL PROTOCOL FOR
COMPENSATION OF CERTAIN DEATH AND PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS PERTAINING TO THE GM
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eligible claimants are also entitled to additional economic damages.6
The subject has attracted occasional academic attention, but much
depends on the discipline that is making the inquiry and the purpose for
calculating the value of a life.7 For example, the approach taken by federal
regulatory agencies varies from the approach that most lawyers take. A
regulatory analysis is usually based on a calculation of the risk involved
and market data (how much one would require for accepting a more
hazardous job, for example).8 In contrast, the approach used by most
attorneys (and usually mandated by statute) is to determine what has been
lost by the survivors, and then to place a value on that loss. Attempts to
collect and analyze results from actual cases are much less common,
however.9
Lawyers and juries grapple with the question of valuing a life in the
context of wrongful-death actions. In North Carolina, the starting point is
section 28A-18-2 of the North Carolina General Statutes.10 This statute is
only a starting point, however. Much depends on the negotiations that take
place prior to trial. This Article reports on the differing values that various
parties—insurers, attorneys, and occasionally, judges and jurors—have
placed on a life wrongfully taken over the five-year period from January 1,
2009, to December 31, 2013, in North Carolina.
In law school, the subject of wrongful death usually comes up in firstyear torts class. Most torts professors (one of the authors included), focus
virtually all of the available class time on a simple binary question: Is the
defendant liable to the plaintiff, or not? The next question—assuming the
defendant is liable to the plaintiff—asks, “What is the appropriate amount

IGNITION SWITCH RECALL 6 (June 30, 2014), http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/
docs/FINAL%20PROTOCOL%20June%2030%20%202014.pdf.
6. Id. at 5–6.
7. See James Ciecka & Seth Epstein, A Comment on the Use of Value of Life Estimates
in Wrongful Death Litigation, 5 J. LEGAL ECON. 75, 79 (1995) (concluding that economics
could provide only limited usefulness in applying value-of-life calculations for wrongfuldeath actions).
8. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537,
549–51 & tbl.2 (2005) (explaining how the United States Government assigns a dollar value
to determine the value of a person’s life).
9. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling
“Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 919–20 (1989) (data based on jury verdicts
collected over a fifteen-year period in Florida and Kansas City); Frank Cross & Charles
Silver, In Texas, Life Is Cheap, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1875 (2006); David W. Leebron, Final
Moments: Damages For Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256 (1989);
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 8.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (2013).
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of damages?” This question receives relatively little attention.11 This is
unfortunate. The question of “how much” will concern both parties
greatly. In practice, the question of “how much” may serve as a way to
avoid answering the first question.
The reasons for this approach are obvious. The question of damages
is a question for the jury. Counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant may
propose various amounts, but the jury makes the ultimate decision.
Substantive standards for determining damages, when they exist, tend to be
qualitative rather than quantitative in nature.12 In other words, nobody
knows. But most cases never advance to trial. They are dropped, settled,
or otherwise dismissed. What about those cases? For the cases that settle,
the amounts are determined by negotiation, against the backdrop of the
relevant statutes and case law—and the available amount of insurance.
Negotiation need not be the equivalent of a black hole. This Article
examines the results of the negotiations that attorneys engage in when the
cause of action is for wrongful death. By examining the results and
comparing them to the results from trial, perhaps a better understanding of
what drives these negotiations will follow.
II. THE RELEVANT LAW
The starting point is the relevant statute, section 28A-18-2.13 That
statute permits the personal representative14 of the decedent to bring an
action for damages against the person or persons deemed responsible for
the decedent’s death.15 The statute thus abrogates the common-law rule
that an action for damages terminates with the death of the would-be
plaintiff.16 The significance of the statute is that it specifies the damages
available.17 The liability of the defendant remains a function of tort law.18
11. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY:
RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 155 (2010).
12. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9, at 910.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2.
14. A personal representative includes both an executor and an administrator of an
estate. Id. § 28A-1-1(5). The personal representative is empowered to maintain an action
for the wrongful death of the decedent by sections 28A-13-3(a)(23) and 28A-18-2(a). Id.
§§ 28A-13-3(a)(23), -18-2(a).
15. Id. § 28A-18-2.
16. DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 492 (N.C. 1987) (stating the common-law
rule that the death of a human being could not be pleaded as an injury and that damages
calculations must stop at the time of a person’s death); Christenbury v. Hedrick, 234 S.E.2d
3, 5 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b).
18. Nelson v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 816, 818 (M.D.N.C. 1982).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss3/8

4

Peeples and Harris: What Is a Life Worth in North Carolina? A Look at Wrongful-Death

2015]

WHAT IS A LIFE WORTH?

501

Section 28A-18-2 was enacted in 196919 to replace former section
28-174.20 The statute expanded the grounds for recovery. No longer
limited to “such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary injury,” the personal representative was permitted to recover
compensation for medical and funeral expenses, the decedent’s pain and
suffering, and the net income of the decedent, as well as compensation for
the loss of the decedent’s services and companionship.21 These last two
items include, but are not limited to, compensation for the loss of the
decedent’s net income, service, protection, care, and assistance that the
decedent would otherwise have provided, and the “society, companionship,
comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice” that the decedent would
otherwise have provided.22 A claim for loss of consortium may also be
asserted under this provision.23 In addition, the statute permits the recovery
of any punitive damages to which the decedent would have been entitled,
as well as nominal damages “when the jury so finds.” 24
The focus of the wrongful-death statute also shifted with the 1969
revision. In contrast to former section 28-174, which permitted recovery of
“such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury
resulting from such death,”25 section 28A-18-2 requires consideration of
the impact on the survivors in calculating recoverable damages.26 As the
North Carolina Court of Appeals noted in Scallon v. Hooper,27
compensation is intended to restore the survivors of the decedent to the
same position that they would have occupied had there been no death.28
The wrongful-death statute is exclusive. It is the only way in which a
beneficiary may recover for the wrongful death of the decedent.29 Other
claims that are unrelated to the wrongful death of the decedent are to be

19. Act of Apr. 14, 1969, ch. 215, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 194 (relating to damages
recoverable for death by wrongful act).
20. DiDonato, 358 S.E.2d at 492–93.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b); DiDonato, 358 S.E.2d at 492–93; see also Robert
G. Byrd, Recent Developments in North Carolina Tort Law, 48 N.C. L. REV. 791, 804
(1970).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4).
23. See Keys v. Duke Univ., 435 S.E.2d 820, 821 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-18-2(b)(5), (6).
25. Id. § 28-174 (repealed 1973).
26. Id. § 28A-18-2 (2013); Livingston v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 601, 606
(E.D.N.C. 1993); Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co., 196 S.E.2d 789, 804 (N.C.
1973).
27. Scallon v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
28. Id. at 845.
29. Christenbury v. Hedrick, 234 S.E.2d 3, 5 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).
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brought under the “survivorship” statute.30 An action may be brought
under the wrongful-death statute only by the personal representative.31
Distribution of any recovery is governed by North Carolina’s Intestate
Succession Act.32 Debts of the decedent, other than those for burial and for
“reasonable hospital and medical expenses . . . incident to the injury
resulting in death,” may not be paid from the amount recovered in a
wrongful-death action.33 The case law is consistent on the point that
recovery for wrongful death is not automatic: damages sought have to be
proved.34 The statute provides that “[a]ll evidence which reasonably tends
to establish any of the elements of damages [enumerated in the statute] is
admissible.”35 Dying declarations of the deceased are also admissible.36
In effect, section 28A-18-2(b) permits two types of recovery for
wrongful death. The first type includes medical and hospital expenses
resulting from the injury that led to death, reasonable funeral expenses, and
“[c]ompensation for pain and suffering.”37 Determination of these three
items does not require any inquiry about the impact on the decedent’s
survivors; it is no different from the calculations that would be needed in
any personal injury claim. The second category does, however, require
consideration of the impact on the survivors. The “present monetary value
of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered” is
what must be determined.38 Because of this directive, two calculations are
necessary: first, a calculation of “present monetary value,” converting an
imagined stream of income into current dollars,39 and second, a
determination of the life expectancy of the decedent’s heirs. The North
Carolina courts have consistently done this by consulting actuarial tables to
determine the longest life expectancy of the decedent’s heirs, and
comparing it to the life expectancy of the decedent, if he or she were still
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-1; see also State Auto Ins. Co. v. Blind, 650 S.E.2d 25,
29 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a); Bowen, 196 S.E.2d at 803.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a). The Intestate Succession Act is codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 29.
33. Id. § 28A-18-2(a); see also Bowen, 196 S.E.2d at 802–05 (discussing the effect of
the 1969 amendments on the provision of funeral expenses); Byrd, supra note 21, at 803.
34. See, e.g., DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 493 (N.C. 1987); Bahl v. Talford,
530 S.E.2d 347, 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(c).
36. Id. § 28A-18-2(d).
37. Id. §§ 28A-18-2(b)(1)–(3).
38. Id. § 28A-18-2(b)(4) (emphasis added).
39. This first calculation is often quite difficult. While the concept of expressing future
losses in terms of present dollars seems straightforward, opinions differ on the proper way
to make this calculation. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9, at 911.
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alive.40 If the life expectancy of the decedent is greater than the life
expectancy of the heirs, the longest life expectancy of the heirs is used.41
For example, imagine a case in which a forty-year-old woman dies, leaving
as her sole survivor a nine-year-old son. Because the life expectancy of the
son is greater than the life expectancy of the mother, the mother’s
remaining (theoretical) life expectancy would be used; in terms of “present
monetary value,” the son could expect no more than that. Likewise, if the
nine-year-old son died, present monetary value would be measured in terms
of his mother’s remaining life expectancy rather than his own.
The statute permits the recovery of both economic (medical and
hospital expenses, funeral expenses, and future net loss income) and
noneconomic damages (the deceased’s pain and suffering between injury
and death, loss of services and loss of society and companionship). In this
sense, it follows general principles of tort law. This means, however, that
an element of uncertainty exists in any wrongful-death action. Calculations
of the “present monetary value” of the deceased’s pain and suffering, the
loss of services, and the loss of society and companionship defy
quantification.42
If not resolved by negotiation, the question of present monetary value
will ultimately be decided by a jury. Set out below are the North Carolina
Pattern Jury Instructions43 for this question. The instructions suggest that
the task will not be an easy one:
Damages for (named deceased)’s death also include fair compensation
for the present monetary value of (name deceased) to his next-of-kin. . . .
There is no fixed formula for determining the present monetary value
of (name deceased) to his next of kin. You must determine what is fair
compensation by applying logic and common sense to the evidence. You
may consider:
[The net income (name deceased) would have earned during the
remainder of his life. You must subtract from (name deceased)’s
40. See, e.g., Livingston v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 601, 605 (E.D.N.C. 1993)
(holding that “[e]conomic loss is calculated by the income of the decedent over the greatest
of the life expectancies of his survivors”); Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co., 196
S.E.2d 789, 806 (N.C. 1973) (“[T]here can be no recovery . . . beyond the life expectancy of
the last surviving parent.”).
41. Bowen, 196 S.E.2d at 805.
42. The task of converting pain and suffering into a monetary amount is a problem in
tort law generally. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A
Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L.
REV. 773, 781 (1995) (acknowledging that “pain and suffering” is required to be calculated
as a form of compensable damages in personal injury actions).
43. N.C. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES 810.50 (2015),
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/pji-master/civil/c810.50.pdf.
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reasonably expected income the amount he would have spent on himself or
for other purposes which would not have benefited his next of kin. The
amount he would have earned depends upon his prospects in life, health,
character, ability, industry and [the means he had for making money] [the
business in which he was employed]. It also depends upon his life
expectancy—that is, the length of time he could reasonably have been
expected to live but for the [negligence] [wrongful conduct] of the
defendant.]
[The services, protection, care and assistance of (name deceased),
whether voluntary or obligatory, to his next-of-kin. These words are to be
given their ordinary meanings. You may consider the family and personal
relations between (name deceased) and his next-of-kin, and what you find
to be the reasonable value of the loss to them of these things over the life
expectancy of (name deceased). . . .]
[The society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and
advice of (name deceased) to his next-of-kin. These words are to be given
their ordinary meaning. You may consider the family and personal
relations between (name deceased) and his next-of-kin and what you find
to be the reasonable value of the loss to them of these things over the life
expectancy of (name deceased). . . .]
....
Any amount you allow as damages for the future monetary value of
(name deceased) to his next-of-kin must be reduced to its present
value . . . .44

The instructions certainly are faithful to the statute and the case law,
but they do not provide much guidance.45 One might argue that these, or
any, jury instructions are incapable of providing guidance, since the jury is
being asked to convert items for which there is no market (such as pain and
suffering, loss of society, and loss of services) into money.46
Livingston v. United States47 illustrates how the statute works in
practice. David Livingston was killed in a motor-vehicle accident when the

44. Id. (footnotes omitted) (brackets in original).
45. This lack of guidance seems to be the case across all jurisdictions. See Leebron,
supra note 9, at 265 (“The law provides no guidance, in terms of any benchmark, standard
figure, or method of analysis, to aid the jury in the process of determining an appropriate
award.”); Joseph Sanders, Why Do Proposals Designed to Control Variability in General
Damages (Generally) Fall on Deaf Ears? (And Why This Is Too Bad), 55 DEPAUL L. REV.
489, 501 (2006) (“The primary impediment to achieving greater consistency is the vague
guidance jurors receive on what is to be compensated and a complete absence of guidelines
for how to translate this into dollar awards.”).
46. Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 765 (1995).
47. Livingston v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1993).
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car that he was driving was struck by a truck driven by an Air Force
serviceman.48 Livingston was thirty-one years old, unmarried, and
survived by only his parents.49 He worked as the manager of a used-car
business that was owned by his father.50 Livingston’s earnings history was
erratic; his annual income varied between less than $1,000 to as much as
$22,620 over the years.51 Although the United States did not contest
liability, the parties were unable to agree on the appropriate damages
award.52 As a result, the case was tried in federal court without a jury.53
The opinion by Judge Howard nicely shows how section 28A-18-2
operates. The “net income” damages of $20,000 awarded by the court
were quite modest, based on Livingston’s income and on his father’s life
expectancy of thirteen years.54 Likewise, medical and funeral expenses
totaled only $11,200.55 Livingston’s pain and suffering from the time of
the accident to the time of his death was set by the court at $10,000.56
On the question of loss of services, protection, care, and assistance,
the court awarded $75,000, and for the loss of society, companionship,
comfort, and guidance, the court awarded $150,000.57 Both of these items,
like net income, were calculated according to “the present monetary value
of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered.”58
The point is a simple one: the statute contains categories that can be
calculated with relative precision (such as net income, medical expenses,
and funeral expenses), as well as categories that defy measurement (such as
pain and suffering, loss of services, and loss of companionship). Since the
statute permits both economic and noneconomic damages, this is no
surprise. This combination of factors—some capable of calculation, others
not—suggests that much depends on the negotiating skill of the attorneys.
III. METHODS
To construct a useful set of North Carolina wrongful-death cases in
which the decedent’s life is explicitly valued, we conducted searches of
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 602.
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 608.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4) (2013); Livingston, 817 F. Supp. at 604.
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multiple online databases, cross-checking the results to avoid duplication.
We also researched the North Carolina appellate reports for the relevant
time period. In addition, we reviewed the closed files of a major medicalmalpractice insurer.59 Over the five-year period from January 1, 2009, to
December 31, 2013, we identified 123 wrongful-death cases, resolved
either by trial or by settlement. The fact that our data are drawn from both
trials and settlements makes this study different from most other empirical
studies on this subject.60
Several of these cases involved multiple deaths.
To avoid
overweighting a single case, we chose a single plaintiff in each of those
cases. From the online reports and the closed claim files, we gathered all
the information available about the deceased plaintiff, his or her survivors,
the manner of death, and the amount recovered. In the course of the
research, it became clear that many wrongful-death cases result in no
recovery at all. Because our analysis is concerned with determinations of
the value of a life wrongfully taken, however, we confine our discussion to
those cases in which some amount of money was in fact recovered.
Our analysis is aided by the fact that North Carolina is a contributoryfault jurisdiction.61 In a tort based on negligence, any “fault” attributed to
the plaintiff will bar his or her recovery.62 This means that the verdicts and
settlements discussed in this Article require no adjustment for comparative
fault, since comparative fault does not exist in North Carolina. The
amounts agreed to, or as found by the jury, thus represent the monetary
value of a particular decedent’s life.63
We cannot be certain that we have identified all of the wrongful-death
resolutions in North Carolina between 2009 and 2013 that resulted in a
monetary recovery. Regarding settlements, we identified the cases in
59. We were given unrestricted access to the closed claim files of a major North
Carolina medical liability insurer. The closed claim files contained information about the
injury alleged, the medical specialty involved, the insurer’s assessment of the liability of its
insured, and basic demographic information about the claimants, along with information
about the final disposition of the claim.
60. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9; Leebron, supra note 9 (looking only at trial
outcomes); see also Cross & Silver, supra note 9 (making use of the Texas Closed Claim
Database—a very large collection of closed insurance files—but not trials, in their study).
61. See Holderfield v. Rummage Bros. Trucking Co., 61 S.E.2d 904, 906 (N.C. 1950);
Moore v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Works, 111 S.E. 776, 777 (N.C. 1922). See generally
CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS ¶ 19.20[1][a], at
384–86 (3d ed. 2012).
62. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 463 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
63. But this statement has one qualification: in 2011, the General Assembly imposed a
$500,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical-malpractice cases. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-21.19.
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which a report was published by the various verdict and settlement
reporting services. These services rely on counsel (usually plaintiff’s
counsel) to report the outcome. As a result, case selection certainly
occurred. Because of this bias, we do not claim that the data represent
either all of the relevant cases, or a valid random sampling of the cases. We
believe, however, that we have identified a large-enough group of cases to
be representative of all the wrongful-death cases resolved during the fiveyear period from 2009 to 2013.
Our data also requires a further qualification: otherwise-useful
information is often omitted in the verdict and settlement reports in
compliance with a confidentiality agreement. Names of the parties, names
of the decedent’s survivors, and the names of defense counsel are
occasionally omitted. The race of the deceased is almost never included in
settlement reports.64
We have attempted to supplement missing
information whenever possible.
IV. RESULTS
We report on 123 cases from forty-six of North Carolina’s one
hundred counties. Wake County had the highest number of wrongful-death
cases and settlements, followed by Mecklenburg County. Almost all of the
cases (n=108) were filed in the North Carolina Superior Court. The three
federal district court divisions in North Carolina accounted for five cases,65
and six cases were resolved prior to commencement of a lawsuit.66 In two
cases, we were unable to identify the court, and one case came from the
North Carolina Industrial Commission.67

64. The race of the deceased, like the age and gender of the deceased, would certainly
be a relevant factor in any analysis of wrongful-death awards. This information, however, is
rarely included in jury verdict and settlement reports. The use of race-based tables to
calculate damages for wrongful death is controversial. See, e.g., McMillan v. City of New
York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that using race to determine damages in
a wrongful-death action violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
United States Constitution).
65. Great W. Cas. Co. v. Fredrics, No. 1:10-cv-00267 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 1, 2012);
Fontenot ex rel. Turner v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00125 (W.D.N.C. July 19, 2011);
Lumsden v. United States, No. 7:06-cv-00060-F (E.D.N.C. Nov. 1, 2010); Parker v. Bladen
County, No. 7:08-cv-00069 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2010); Hines v. United States, No. 1:07-cv00288 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2009).
66. E.g., Estate of Murphy v. Bellamy (settlement reached Sept. 27, 2013) (LEXIS,
American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch).
67. Estate of Harbin v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., I.C. No. TA-22283
(N.C. Indus. Comm’n Nov. 5, 2013); see Amber Nimocks, Verdicts & Settlements
November 15, 2013: State-Administered Overdose Results in $528K Award, N.C. LAW.
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A. Type of Death
There are many ways to die, and our data reflect that fact. Not
surprisingly, the most common cause of death was motor-vehicle
collisions. Of the thirty-two cases involving motor-vehicle collisions, at
least three involved driving while impaired, which added another potential
defendant in those cases—the establishment that served alcohol to the
driver.68 One case involved a motorboat collision in which at least one of
the operators was allegedly under the influence of alcohol.69 The second
most common cause of death was perhaps more of a surprise: eight deaths
were caused by radiologists’ misreadings of X-rays or CT films.70 Other
medical-diagnostic errors across various specialties accounted for eleven
deaths.71 Four decedents died from gunshot wounds,72 two died from burns
and smoke inhalation,73 one from strangulation,74 and another from a
stabbing.75 There were two instances of cardiac arrest induced by a Taser
gun.76

WKLY. (Nov. 15, 2013). The authors did not conduct a separate search of the awards made
in workers’-compensation cases.
68. See, e.g., Estate of Anonymous 23-Year-Old Female v. Anonymous Driver (N.C.
Super. Oct. 26, 2009); Davis v. Brown, No. 04-CVS-1183 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 2009).
69. Anonymous Decedent’s Estate v. Anonymous Boater (N.C. Super Ct. May 6,
2010).
70. Results on file with author (settlements involve confidential data from major
medical-malpractice insurer in North Carolina).
71. See, e.g., Smalls v. W. Carolina Univ. (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2012) (LEXIS,
American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Anonymous 62-Year-Old Male v.
Anonymous Dermatopathologist (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2012) (LEXIS, American Lawyer
Media (ALM) VerdictSearch) (failure to diagnose rare cancer); Plaintiff v. Defendant
Surgeon, 2010 WL 9446841 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2010) (negligent follow-up surgery
following bariatric surgery).
72. See Kluttz v. Town of Spencer (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2012) (LEXIS, American
Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Arrington v. Martinez, No. 06 CVS 17916 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2012); Blevins v. Hammer, No. 09CVS398 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 11,
2011); Estate of Caskey v. Estate of Campbell, No. 09-CVS-4836 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 20,
2010) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch).
73. See, e.g., Decedent v. Apartment Complex (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2010) (LEXIS,
American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch).
74. Estate of Doe v. XYZ Med. Ctr. (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2013) (LEXIS, American
Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch).
75. Estate of Williams v. ACC/Merritt, LLC, No. 08-CVS-12969 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan.
11, 2010) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch).
76. Fontenot ex rel. Turner v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00125 (W.D.N.C. July 19,
2011); Parker v. Bladen County, No. 7:08-cv-00069 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2010).
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B. Type of Resolution
Settlements greatly outnumbered every other category of resolution.
There were one hundred settlements, fifteen jury trials, and three bench
trials.77 One case was settled after a jury trial.78 The remaining four cases
were either agency awards or a combination of settlement and default
judgments.79
C. Age, Gender, and Marital Status of the Deceased
The deceased ranged in age from stillborn infants80 to age ninetythree. The average age was 45.6 years (median forty-four years). There
were fifty-nine males and sixty-two females.81 Fifty-four of the decedents
were married; twenty-one were single; eight were divorced; three were
widowed; and thirteen were minors.82
D. Amount Recovered
We were able to ascertain the amount recovered by the plaintiff in all
but one case.83 In obtaining the amount recovered, we encountered twelve
cases in which the amount recovered was not clearly “global,” meaning
that other sources of compensation may have existed. As a result, we
report on “global” and “non-global” results separately.84 There were also
several cases that involved more than one decedent. When individual
allocations of the wrongful-death awards were not available, we divided the
total amount recovered by the number of decedents to arrive at the amount
recovered.

77. Complete list of results on file with author.
78. Results on file with author.
79. Results on file with author.
80. Under North Carolina law, wrongful-death damages are available for the death of a
viable but unborn child. See DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 493–94 (N.C. 1987).
81. In two cases, we were unable to determine the gender of the deceased. In twentyfour cases, we were unable to determine the marital status of the deceased.
82. Because jury verdict and settlement reports and court records do not routinely
report the race of plaintiffs or defendants, we were unable to collect sufficient data to report
on these demographic variables.
83. Estate of Majlaton v. Lutz, No. 10-CVS-021416 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2012)
(LEXIS, Dolan Media Verdicts & Settlements).
84. We labeled a case “global” if we were confident that all potential defendants had
participated in the settlement, or in the case of a trial, were named and made subject to the
court’s jurisdiction. “Non-global” resolutions are cases with only partial settlements, as
well as cases in which there was reason to believe that other potential defendants might be
involved.
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We included only one decedent in multiple-decedent cases in our
dataset to avoid overstating the amounts recovered. In most multiple-death
cases, the amount recovered per decedent was relatively high; including all
decedents in these cases would have produced a higher number of cases,
but it would also have distorted the average and median amounts
recovered.
E. Insurance
Most defendants were insured, but some were not.85 The absence of
insurance makes actual payment less likely and may explain why most of
the defendants had insurance. An attorney would likely hesitate to bring a
wrongful-death action against an uninsured defendant because the attorney
would wonder about the chances of collecting any amount recovered.
The existence of insurance raises an additional question: To what
extent does the amount of coverage determine the amount recovered?86
The amount recovered varied greatly, ranging from a low of $4,000 to a
high of $10,665,000. Figure 1 below illustrates the dispersion in the
results.
Figure 1: Award Amounts

Number of Awards

30
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20
15
10
5
0

Award Amounts (in Thousands)

85. Defendants were uninsured in eleven of the cases used in our results. We included
in the “uninsured” category cases in which it appeared that the defendant was substantially
underinsured.
86. See infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
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As Figure 1 shows, the amounts recovered are highly skewed. Put
another way, the results from the cases raise questions of horizontal
equity87: if the severity of the injury (in this study, death) is the same, what
explains the variation?
When only global cases are considered, the range remains impressive,
from a low of $9,000 to a high of $10,665,000. For the 110 cases in our
study, the mean award was $1,300,740, and the median was $590,000.
Jury verdicts produced numbers much higher than did settlements, as Table
1 shows. When only “global” cases with insurance available were
examined, the difference between trial and settlement outcomes remained
substantial.
Table 1: Jury Verdicts and Settlements
Type of
Resolution
Jury verdict

Settlement

Mean and Median
Recovery
Amounts for All
Cases
Total Cases: 15
Mean: $3,128,872
Median: $2,224,080

Recovery Amounts
for Global Cases

Recovery Amounts
for Global Cases
with Insurance

Total Cases: 15
Mean: $3,128,872
Median: $2,224,080

Total Cases: 11
Mean: $3,004,454
Median: $2,000,000

Total Cases: 99
Mean: $779,757
Median: $490,000

Total Cases: 88
Mean: $853,533
Median: $500,000

Total Cases: 86
Mean: $850,022
Median: $500,000

Ninety-two different attorneys represented the 123 estates. Only five
attorneys represented three or more plaintiffs. There were fewer defense
attorneys, for two reasons. First, the identity of defense counsel was often
not disclosed. Second, defense attorneys were more likely to be repeat
players. Dividing the number of cases in which the identity of plaintiff’s
counsel was known (123) by the number of different plaintiff’s counsel
(92) produces an average number of cases per attorney of 1.337. Dividing
the number of cases in which the identity of defense counsel was known
(77) by the number of different defense counsel (43) produces an average
number of cases per attorney of 1.791.88
We identified eight cases in which the defendant was a nursing
home.89 The amounts awarded varied greatly, from a low of $85,000 to a
87. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9, at 924.
88. In three cases, the defendant was not represented by counsel.
89. See, e.g., Rice v. Britthaven, Inc., No. 2010-CVS-000099 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 24,
2012); Estate of Baker v. Britthaven, Inc., No. 10-CVS-690 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2012)
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high of $1,635,000 (a mean of $650,000 and a median of $440,000). This
range seems curious, since residents of nursing homes tend to be elderly
and unemployed.
Men fared better than women. The average “global” award for men
was $1,408,596 (a median of $600,000), while the average “global” award
for women was $1,203,841 (a median of $590,000). The average award for
minors was $1,304,667 (a median of $700,000).
The marital status of the deceased made a difference as well, as shown
in Table 2.
Table 2: Marital Status and Amount Recovered
Marital Status
Single

Number of
Cases
19

Mean and Median “Global”
Recovery Amounts
Mean: $2,082,245
Median: $860,000

Married

50

Mean: $1,306,824
Median: $600,000

Divorced

5

Mean: $259,400
Median: $185,000

Widowed

3

Mean: $108,333
Median: $75,000

Minor

10

Mean: $1,374,200
Median: $753,750

Total = 88

The results for decedents with no income—i.e., infants, children,
unemployed and disabled adults—illustrates how open-ended the inquiry
often is.90 The dataset contains twenty-seven cases of decedents with no
income in which the amount recovered represented a “global” resolution
(meaning that there are no other defendants in cases still pending).91 The
(LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Alzheimer’s Patient v. Nursing
Home (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2010) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM)
VerdictSearch); Estate of Odom v. Aston Park Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 08 CVS 2268
(N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch);
Anonymous 81 Year Old Female v. Anonymous Nursing Home (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1,
2009) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch).
90. Results on file with author.
91. See supra Table 2.
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awards ranged from a low of $70,000 to a high of $4,160,000, with a mean
of $988,963 and a median of $700,000.92 In these cases, “net present
income” would presumably be at or near zero. Having an income produced
a higher average amount recovered ($1,402,162), but the median amount
was lower than the median amount for decedents with no income
($575,000).93
There is some evidence that the perceived character of the deceased
affects the amount recovered. In six cases, we found indications from the
reports that the deceased was of doubtful character or was engaged in
unsavory conduct.94 The mean and median awards in those six cases were
$387,097 and $397,319, respectively—far below the corresponding awards
for the cases in which there was no indication of unsavoriness conduct or
character (a mean of $1,353,450 and a median of $600,000). On the other
hand, when the deceased could be characterized as a crime victim, the
amounts recovered were higher (a mean of $1,815,155 and a median of
$1,786,000 in twenty cases) than for those who could not be so
characterized (a mean of $1,186,426 and a median of $533,973 in ninety
cases).
Slightly less than half of the cases (sixty-one cases) arose as medicalmalpractice claims. Motor-vehicle accidents accounted for thirty-two
cases. Three of those cases involved a combination of motor-vehicle
accidents and dram-shop liability.95 There were sixteen cases of death by
negligence other than medical malpractice and motor-vehicle accidents.
Twelve cases arose as intentional torts—specifically, assault and battery.96

92. See supra Table 2.
93. See supra Table 2.
94. See, e.g., Parker v. Bladen County, No. 7:08-cv-00069 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2010);
Kluttz v. Town of Spencer (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2012) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media
(ALM) VerdictSearch); Anonymous 29-Year Old Female v. Anonymous Dump Truck
Driver (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2012) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM)
VerdictSearch); Jones v. Underwood, No. 10CVS1966 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2011)
(LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Estate of Harbin v. N.C. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., I.C. No. TA-22283 (N.C. Indus. Comm’n Nov. 5, 2013).
95. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. XYZ Med. Ctr. (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2013) (LEXIS,
American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Arrington v. Martinez, No. 06 CVS 17916
(N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2012); Blevins v. Hammer, No. 09CVS398 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar.
11, 2011); Estate of Caskey v. Estate of Campbell, No. 09-CVS-4836 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept.
20, 2010) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Estate of Williams v.
ACC/Merritt, LLC, No. 08-CVS-12969 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2010) (LEXIS, American
Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch).
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Finally, there were two cases involving products liability.97
The data suggest that how the deceased died makes a difference in
terms of the amount recovered in a subsequent lawsuit. Sorted by cause of
action, and restricting the analysis to “global” cases, Table 3 sets out the
mean and median awards in each category.
Table 3: Cause of Action and Amount Recovered
Cause of
Action

Mean and Median
Recovery Amounts
for All Cases98

“Global” Cases

“Global” Cases
with Insurance

MotorVehicle
Accidents

Total Cases: 32
Mean: $1,390,522
Median: $1,292,500

Total Cases: 29
Mean: $1,524,507
Median: $1,400,000

Total Cases: 25
Mean: $1,284,449
Median: $1,250,000

Medical
Malpractice

Total Cases: 60
Mean: $841,650
Median: $400,000

Total Cases: 52
Mean: $934,692
Median: $400,000

Total Cases: 52
Mean: $934,692
Median: $400,000

Other
Negligence

Total Cases: 16
Mean: $1,060,665
Median: $484,819

Total Cases: 15
Mean: $1,131,109
Median: $500,000

Total Cases: 13
Mean: $689,741
Median: $469,638

Intentional
Torts

Total Cases: 12
Mean: $1,750,007
Median: $1,300,000

Total Cases: 12
Mean: $1,750,007
Median: $1,300,000

Total Cases: 7
Mean: $1,313,857
Median: $580,000

Within each category, we found widely dispersed results. The mean
and median recovery amounts within the four causes of action indicate,
however, that lives are valued differently, and that one factor in explaining
the difference is how the deceased died. Consistent with these findings, a
violent death99 resulted in an average award of $1,742,967 (a median of
97. Fontenot ex rel. Turner v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00125 (W.D.N.C. July 19,
2011).
98. Because there were only two products-liability cases, these results were excluded
from Table 3. Likewise, because the amount recovered in one medical-malpractice case
could not be obtained, that case was excluded from Table 3.
99. All of the motor-vehicle accident cases in our dataset were “violent.” The
intentional-tort cases were also labeled as violent, since they each involved the tort of
battery. In contrast, very few of the medical-malpractice cases were labeled as violent.
Some, but not all, of the “other negligence” cases qualified as violent.
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$1,367,500), while a nonviolent death resulted in a lower average award of
$958,371 (a median of $400,000).
The data also suggest that conceding liability saved money. In the
forty-three cases in which liability was conceded (or thought to be likely),
the average award was $1,087,389 (a median of $490,000). In cases where
liability was contested, the average award was $1,540,904 (a median of
$600,000). Of course, this sort of analysis does not take into account the
cases in which no award was made at all. It does suggest, however, that
choosing to contest liability comes with a price.
In spite of the great range of the verdicts and settlements, it would be
misleading to think that the results are completely random. For example,
the age of the deceased correlates with the amount of the “global” awards.
The relationship is negative and statistically significant (p < .01). This
suggests, in other words, that the value of a young person’s life is worth
more than the value of an older person’s life.
V. DISCUSSION
Although the injury in each of the cases was the same, the results
obtained varied greatly. Every empirical study of wrongful-death cases has
noted great variation in results.100 Is this a problem? If one’s perspective is
horizontal equity—the view that compensation for the same injury should
be roughly the same, regardless of who the deceased was, or how the
deceased died—then the variation in the results is troublesome.101 One can,
however, take a different view, suggested by the preceding description of
the many different ways that the deceased in this study died. The many
ways that one can die suggests that every case is different.102 The
circumstances will be different, and, of course, the identity of the deceased
will be different. The imagined levels of pre-death pain and suffering will
also vary, depending, among other things, on the length of the interval
between injury and death and the intensity of the accident that led to the
death.103
The disparity in results between jury verdicts and settlements is
substantial and hard to ignore. However, because the number of jury
verdicts (fifteen) was quite low compared to the number of settlements
100. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9, at 919–24; Cross & Silver, supra note 9, at
1890–91; Leebron, supra note 9, at 309–11; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 544–45.
101. See JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW
125 (forthcoming 2016) (describing issues surrounding “horizontal equity” in tort law).
102. See Leebron, supra note 9, at 258.
103. See generally Posner & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 542 (noting that “agencies opt for
uniformity, whereas courts call for a high degree of individuation”).
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(eighty-nine), the disparity may be due to the much smaller number of
cases decided by jury. In any event, the disparity cannot be explained by
the cause of action involved. The types of cases tried to a jury were not
markedly different from the types of cases resolved by settlement. The
disparity also cannot be explained by arguing that cases without insurance
were more likely to go to trial. When only cases with insurance are
considered, the results between trial and settlement remain very different.
It is possible, however, that the existence of insurance still provides an
answer. Perhaps in the ten cases with insurance that went to trial, the
insurer and the plaintiff were simply unable to agree on liability at all. As a
result, when the plaintiff wins, higher recoveries can be expected;
plaintiff’s counsel has not had to “discount” her demand in order to obtain
a settlement. Our data support this hypothesis; in only one of the ten cases
tried to a jury in which insurance was available was liability thought by the
defense to be likely. In eight of the ten cases, liability was contested, and
in the remaining case, we were unable to determine the liability
assessment.104
The absence of insurance increases the chances that the defendant will
be unrepresented. It also seems likely that the existence, and especially the
amount, of insurance in a given case affect these results. For example, if a
decedent is killed in a collision with a motorist who carries only $100,000
in liability coverage and the motorist lacks substantial personal assets, the
decedent’s life may be “valued” at or near $100,000.105 It is difficult to
escape the conclusion that insurance has a strong influence in determining
the value of a life. In this sense, the minimum motor-vehicle liabilityinsurance requirement of $30,000 for the death of one person imposed by
the General Statutes seems inadequate.106
Recoveries varied by cause of action.107 Looking only at “global”
cases, the ordering makes some sense. Intentional torts in the context of
wrongful death are likely to be violent and repugnant. Motor-vehicle
accidents are likely to be violent, but, like accidents, not necessarily
repugnant. “Other negligence” can be either violent or nonviolent; in
contrast, medical malpractice is seldom violent. Perhaps violent deaths
evoke more sympathy, or are thought to evoke more sympathy, from jurors.
The finding that a violent death resulted in average and median awards
much greater than those for a nonviolent death supports this view.

104. Results on file with author.
105. See Cross & Silver, supra note 9, at 1908 (detailing the effect of insurance on a
victim’s recovery).
106. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (2013).
107. Supra Table 3.
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Less money was paid when the defendant privately viewed liability as
certain or likely. However, our data do not take into account the cases in
which no award was made at all. In those cases, liability was likely
contested. Perhaps this means that there is a price for choosing to contest
liability. It also suggests the influence of insurance and the adjusting
process.
We found a negative correlation between age and the amount
recovered, meaning that in general, as age increased, the amount of the
award declined. Using economic analysis only, this result might seem
surprising. The projected earnings of a middle-aged man with an
expectation of working another twenty or thirty years should easily exceed
the projected earnings of a teenager who has never worked full-time. As
discussed above, however, because the statute permits consideration of
factors other than projected earning, room remains for noneconomic
adjustments. A number of the decedents in our study had either little or no
income, yet their estates recovered substantial amounts.108 In any event,
this finding is consistent with other studies.109
Males did better than females.
When children survived the
decedent—regardless of their age—the award tended to increase. The
average and median awards varied greatly by marital status. Single adults
fared best, followed by minors, married individuals, divorced individuals,
and widowed individuals. This otherwise-surprising result may be largely
due to age rather than marital status. The average age for a single
individual was just over thirty-three years (a median of just over thirty
years), but for a married individual, the average age was fifty-two years (a
median of forty-nine years). The average age of divorced individuals was
just over fifty-nine years (a median of fifty-nine years), while the average
age of widowed individuals was eighty-one years (a median of eighty-eight
years). These results make some sense, since age is negatively correlated
with the amount of recovery.
One other factor may help to explain the variation, and it merits
further investigation. Every estate in this study was represented by an
attorney, as were most of the defendants. Perhaps the relative skill of the
attorneys in a given case explains much of the variation. The fact that most
of the cases were resolved by negotiated settlement makes that suspicion
more plausible.

108. See, e.g., supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing awards to the estates of
decedents who were in nursing homes, presumably not making any income).
109. See Cross & Silver, supra note 9, at 1914–15.
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CONCLUSION
On first impression, the results from the data seem random. If the
injury (death) is the same, why are the recoveries so different in amount?
On further inspection of the data, some revealing patterns emerge. First,
age is negatively correlated with the amount recovered. In general, the
estates of younger decedents receive more than the estates of older
decedents. Second, how the amount was recovered seems to matter. Jury
verdicts produced much-higher recoveries than settlements did. Third, how
the decedent died makes a difference. Violent deaths, such as those from
motor-vehicle accidents, yielded larger amounts than did nonviolent deaths.
Left unexplored for now is the link between the skill of the plaintiff’s
attorney and the eventual recovery for the estate.
Perhaps the most important pattern is also the most obvious one: the
importance of insurance. Most of the defendants in the cases were insured.
As noted above, this is probably not a coincidence. More troublesome is
the next question: To what extent do insurance limits determine the value
of a life wrongfully taken? The answer, at least for most causes of action,
seems to be that the liability-insurance limits that a defendant carries define
the upper limit on the value of a life wrongfully taken.
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